We examine the impact of global IFRS adoption on cross-border equity investments by individual investors. Our proxy for these cross-border equity investments is trading volume in the Open Market at Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The Open Market is a segment designed for German individual investors to trade a large selection of foreign stocks. Using a sample of 5,637 firms from 31 countries around the world, we find that stocks experience an increase in Open Market trading volume following mandatory adoption of IFRS. This increase is both economically and statistically significant. Our results are consistent with the idea that collective IFRS adoption has the potential to reinforce cross-border equity investments by individual investors.
Introduction
Over the last decade, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been introduced in over 100 countries around the world (see http://www.iasplus.com/country/ useias.htm). Regulators justify the move towards IFRS by the expectation that collective adoption of IFRS will, among other benefits, enhance the comparability of financial statements across countries and, thus, reinforce foreign equity investments (e.g., EC Regulation No. 1606 /2002 . In this paper, we evaluate this claim by analyzing the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on cross-border equity investments by individual investors. 1
Despite the focus on institutional investors in prior literature, individual investors play a vital role in financial markets. At the end of 2007, domestic individuals directly owned 14% of the market value of listed stocks in Europe (FESE, 2008) . In the United States (U.S.), more than 20% of equity is held directly by individual investors (French, 2008) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that individual investors are more likely to pursue long-term objectives than their institutional counterparts. Companies therefore make great efforts to attract individual investors, e.g. via corporate websites and investor relations departments (Vogelheim et al., 2001) . The relevance of individual investors is also recognized by regulators. For example, one of the explicitly stated purposes of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to "extend individual investor protection" (SEC, 2008) . Mary Shapiro, the current SEC chair, emphasizes that "without rules to protect [individual] investors, financial systems will not raise capital and the economy will not grow" (FINRA, 2008) . 1 We use the term individual investors to refer to non-institutional investors. Retail investors and private investors are synonymous expressions used in prior studies. It is interesting to note that some of the earliest research examining individual investors" use and understanding of financial statement information was provided by Sir David Tweedie, the long-time Chairman of the IASB (e.g., Lee and Tweedie, 1977) .
We predict that following global IFRS adoption 2 individual investors increase their investments in foreign IFRS stocks. This prediction is based on two assumptions. First, accounting information affects cross-border equity investments of individual investors, either because they use financial statements by themselves and/or because they consult information intermediaries (e.g., the business media or financial advisors) that in turn rely on financial statements. The second assumption is that country-specific accounting standards create entry barriers to investments in foreign stocks, because individual investors or the respective information intermediaries do not have the resources to familiarize themselves with local GAAPs. Global IFRS adoption removes these entry barriers by replacing country-specific accounting rules with one single set of standards.
We test our prediction by using trading volume in the Open Market at Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) as a proxy for cross-border equity investments by individual investors. The
Open Market is an unofficial trading segment designed for German individual investors to trade a selection of foreign (i.e., non-German) stocks that have their main listing at a home market abroad. This selection is very large (about one quarter of all firms in the Datastream Universesee Table 1 ), because Open Market lead brokers are allowed to independently include securities in the Open Market at low cost and without any involvement by the issuer. 3 Although these lead brokers set higher bid-ask spreads, the Open Market provides a cost-efficient alternative to the home markets when trade sizes are low. German retail banks and brokers pass on high, mostly 2 The European Union, Australia, Hong Kong, South Africa and many other countries around the world mandated IFRS or IFRS equivalents for most listed firms from fiscal year 2005 onwards. The treatment group in our empirical analysis is confined to IFRS adopters from these countries (see Table 1 , Panel A). Here and in the following, we therefore use the term global IFRS adoption to refer to the mandatory introduction of IFRS in 2005. 3 The lead brokers are not required to inform issuers, let alone seek approval for inclusion of securities in the Open Market. This feature of the Open Market is similar to unsponsored (involuntary) cross-listings in the U.S. that became possible following a recent SEC disclosure deregulation (Iliev et al., 2010) .
fixed order fees when local clients choose to trade directly on a foreign exchange, whereas fixed charges for trading at FSE are considerably lower. For small trade sizes, the higher bid-ask spreads are therefore outweighed by lower order processing costs in the Open Market (see Appendix A for an illustrative example). In short, Open Market lead brokers provide German individual investors with cheaper access to foreign stocks.
There are two reasons why increases in Open Market trading volume proxies for increases in cross-border equity investments. First, liquidity in the Open Market is low so that the lead broker typically cannot match offsetting orders by the individual investors. Instead, the lead broker has to carry out a countertrade in the respective home market to rebalance her inventory. Trading volume in the Open Market therefore largely reflects changes in cross-border equity investments by German individual investors rather than trades between these investors. The second reason is that Open Market investors have no restrictions on the buying side, while they can only sell stocks they own. We conclude from this observation that increases in Open Market trading volume are more likely to reflect increases rather than decreases in cross-border equity investments. Appendix B provides statistics from a brokerage dataset that support this conclusion.
Our empirical analysis is based on a proprietary dataset from FSE that contains information on trading volume in the Open Market for the period January 2002 to June 2008. The Open
Market sample comprises 5,637 (43,671) unique firms (firm periods) from 31 countries around the world. Descriptive statistics confirm that liquidity in the Open Market is low. For example, during the average firm period, trading occurs on slightly less than 25% of all trading days. The mean (median) trade size in the Open Market is about 2,700 (1,700) Euro which corroborates that this segment is used by individual investors. Event study results show Open Market trading volume increases significantly around annual earnings announcements. This finding lends support to the assumption that accounting information affects Open Market trading volume as our proxy for cross-border equity investments by individual investors.
In our main analysis, we employ a difference-in-differences design to compare the impact of global IFRS adoption on Open Market trading volume of the treatment group (IFRS adopters) versus the control group (non-adopters). The regression results show that Open Market trading volume of mandatory IFRS adopters increases by more than 50% relative to the control group.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of variables that control for concurrent changes in market value, home market trading volume, stock return volatility and media coverage in Germany.
Further tests show that the estimated IFRS effects are not driven by firms that start preparing their financial statements in English or by concurrent reductions in the bid-ask spread difference between the Open Market and the respective home markets. The effect for voluntary IFRS adopters following global IFRS adoption is weaker and not always statistically significant.
In additional tests on the identification of the IFRS effect, we first repeat the difference-indifferences analysis by artificially moving the starting period of global IFRS adoption. The results confirm that the estimated IFRS effects in the main analysis reflect a structural break in Open Market trading volume rather than the continuation of country-specific time trends. In the second set of additional tests, we perform within-country analyses for the United Kingdom and Taken together, our empirical analyses provide strong evidence that global IFRS adoption is associated with increases in trading volume in the Open Market. While we cannot fully identify the causal mechanism that drives this association, our results are generally consistent with the idea that collective IFRS adoption enhances cross-border investments by individual investors.
This paper makes several contributions to literature. First, we add to the emerging research on the economic consequences of IFRS. To our knowledge, we provide the first analysis of how individual investors react to global IFRS adoption. Our study is most closely related to DeFond et al. (2011) and Yu (2009) who find that foreign mutual fund ownership increases following mandatory IFRS adoption. Since institutional investors exhibit systematically different investment patterns than individuals (e.g., Bhattacharya, 2001; Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2007) , it is not clear ex-ante whether these insights from the mutual fund industry predict individuals investors" reaction to global IFRS adoption. Second, our study is related to the home bias literature. Prior research offers both information-based and behavioral explanations for individuals" tendency to overinvest in local assets (e.g., Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005; Graham et al., 2009) . We add to this research by providing evidence that cross-country heterogeneity in accounting standards also contributes to the home bias of individual investors. Finally, we introduce a novel and unique setting into the currently highly dynamic literature on individual investors (e.g., Lawrence, 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 2010) . This setting allows us to directly observe the aggregate trading activities of a large and homogenous group of individual investors, i.e. German individual investors trading in foreign stocks. the Open Market is a consequence of its unique set of rules. 6 These rules permit eligible brokerage houses, i.e. those that are accredited for trading at FSE, to include securities in the Open Market on their own initiative ( §2 (3) AGB). The stock issuing company need not be informed, nor need it approve inclusion of its securities in the Open Market. For the brokerage house, the inclusion process involves two basic requirements. First, it has to guarantee orderly fulfillment of transactions by acting as a lead broker ( §14 (1) AGB). Second, it has to pay a nonrecurring fee of 750 Euro ( §35 AGB). Follow-up obligations of the lead broker are confined to informing the FSE about essential company news concerning the issuer that can be acquired "by generally accessible information sources in a reasonable way" ( §16 AGB). Lead brokers are authorized to exclude securities from the Open Market at any time with a notice period of four weeks, or without notice "upon good cause" ( §33 (2) AGB). 7 In summary, brokerage houses face very few constraints or institutional barriers relating to inclusion or exclusion of securities in the Open Market.
The Open Market
Once a security has been included, the lead broker holds the exclusive right to set bid and ask quotes. 8 Although officially non-binding ( §79 FSE Exchange Rules), these quotes are de-facto tradable up to a size the lead broker specifies (Freihube et al., 1999) . When an investor places an order to trade on the bid (ask) quote, the lead broker buys (delivers) the agreed number of stocks.
The resulting position would then be immediately closed with an offsetting order to entirely 6 We refer to this set of rules as AGB in the following. AGB stands for "Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen für den Freiverkehr an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse" (General Terms and Conditions for the Regulated Unofficial Market).
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Order books of Open Market securities can also be terminated by FSE ( §33 (1) AGB). For example, in December 2005, FSE suspended trading in Turkish stocks until further notice because of unanswered questions about a planned tax on Turkish equities (Greil, 2005). 8 In case more than one party applies to be the lead broker for a particular stock, the allocation of the order book is decided by lot. hardly surprising. While trading at FSE is confined to a small subset of individual investors (i.e.
German individual investors), institutional investors who account for most trading volume will prefer to trade in the respective home market. 15 Average trade size at FSE is about 2,700 Euro which is well below the threshold typically used in the prior literature to distinguish between individual and institutional investors (e.g., Bhattacharya, 2001; Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2007) . Comparison of bid-ask spreads across exchanges indicates that the variable fee the lead broker charges on Open Market transactions is in fact substantial: the median bid-ask spread is 3.13% at FSE compared to only 0.28% in the respective home markets. Taken together, these descriptive statistics confirm that the Open Market at FSE is a trading segment that is specifically designed for individual investors.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPEN MARKET
In this section, we complement the descriptive analysis of the Open Market by providing evidence on (1) the characteristics of stocks tradable in the Open Market and (2) trading volume around earnings announcements.
Determinants of Open Market Inclusion
Stocks are tradable in the Open Market if they have been included by the lead broker. This decision depends on a stock"s potential to generate sufficient Open Market trading volume and thus brokerage fees. Potential trading volume in the Open Market is ultimately determined by individual investors" demand for a particular stock. 15 Untabulated statistics show that trading volume at FSE aggregated over the whole Open Market sample varies between 10 and 20 billion Euros per year. Hence, despite its relative lack of liquidity the Open Market offers substantial income opportunities for its participants. For example, with an average brokerage fee of 0.08% of the order volume (see Appendix A) Open Market lead brokers earn a total of 8 to 16 million Euros per year for their services. Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that the Open Market sample is a nonrepresentative subset of the DS Universe. Specifically, the Open Market sample is significantly tilted towards more visible and transparent companies. Thus, it seems that the lead broker acts as a gatekeeper to the Open Market, either proactively acting as a screening intermediary or explicitly responding to demand from individual investors. These findings have implications for the interpretation of our main empirical results (see section 4).
Earnings Announcement Reactions
In this subsection, we analyze abnormal trading volume of Open Market stocks around annual earnings announcements. Table 4 , Panel B, compares reactions at FSE with those in the respective home markets for the same set of earnings announcements. The analysis is based on a sample of 18,362 earnings announcement dates from IBES. Abnormal trading volume is the difference between trading volume on the event day and the mean daily volume for that stock over the pre-announcement window (-120, -21), scaled by the mean daily volume.
The results show that abnormal trading volume at FSE increases significantly around earnings announcements. While the effect on mean abnormal trading volume is similar to that in the home markets, median abnormal trading volume remains unchanged at -1.0000 throughout the event window due to the low liquidity at FSE (see, e.g., the statistics on Trading Days (%) in Table 2 , Panel A). These results provide direct evidence that the release of earnings information influences trading volume in the Open Market.
Empirical Analysis
3.1. GLOBAL IFRS ADOPTION AND OPEN MARKET TRADING VOLUME
Research Design
In this section, we test our main prediction that global IFRS adoption enhances cross-border equity investments by individual investors. Our proxy for these cross-border equity investments is trading volume in the Open Market denoted as OM Trading Volume. 17 The key independent where Voluntary*IFRS is an interaction term that equals one (zero) after (before) voluntary IFRS adoption and Controls j denotes the set of control variables. Consistent with our main prediction, we expect the coefficient estimate on Post-IFRS*Mandatory to be positive, i.e. β 2 > 0. To the extent that the comparability benefits of global IFRS adoption spill over to voluntary adopters, we also expect a positive coefficient estimate on Post-IFRS*Voluntary (β 3 ). However, the latter effect is of second order and therefore likely to smaller, i.e. β 2 > β 3 > 0.
Following related IFRS literature (e.g., Daske et al., 2008) we estimate regression specification [1] using a firm fixed effects model. The goal of this difference-in-differences 18 Many listed companies in Germany adopted IFRS well before global IFRS adoption took off, either voluntarily (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Daske, 2006) or due to exchange regulation of the former New Market (e.g., Leuz, 2003) . These early adoptions enabled German investors to familiarize themselves at an early stage with IFRS through their investments in domestic stocks. We therefore assume that Open Market investors react promptly to global IFRS adoption. We test the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in section 3. Taken together, the regression results provide strong evidence consistent with our prediction that (1) global IFRS adoption enhances Open Market trading volume and (2) this effect is stronger for mandatory than for voluntary adopters.
Empirical Findings

ANALYSES ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE IFRS EFFECT
Shifting the Switch of the Post-IFRS Dummy
The regression results presented in the previous section are based on the assumption that Open Market trading volume reacts to financial statement information immediately after the respective fiscal year end. We therefore defined that the key independent variable Post-IFRS switches in the suggest that there is a structural break in Open Market trading volume around global IFRS adoption. More importantly, this structural break is confined to stocks of mandatory IFRS adopters. To the extent that the subsample is more powerful than the full sample in disentangling a potential IFRS effect, the findings of this section lend some support to our prediction of a causal relation between global IFRS adoption and Open Market trading volume.
Within-Country Analyses
In this section, we exploit institutional peculiarities in two countries to gain further insights on the existence of an IFRS effect on Open Market trading volume. To this end, we perform withincountry analyses for the United Kingdom and Australia.
For the analysis of firms from the United Kingdom, we use mandatory IFRS adopters listed in The following two subsections discuss results from treatment group partitions at the country and industry level (section 3.3.1.) as well as at the firm level (section 3.3.2.). The results are presented in Table 6 . All reported regressions are based on the subsample used in the previous sections and include the same control variables as regression model 4 in Table 4 . We refer to untabulated regressions based on the full sample only if the results provide new insights.
Treatment Group Partitions at Country and Industry Level
We use four different variables to partition the treatment group at the country or industry level. First, Euro distinguishes between countries that have adopted the Euro as their national currency (variable equals one) and countries that have not (variable equals zero). The regression result from this partition show that the estimated IFRS effect is not systematically different for firms from the Euro zone compared to the rest of the treatment group. We can therefore rule out the alternative explanation that our results reflect a Euro rather than an IFRS effect. The second partitioning variable, EM Measure (Country Level), is a binary variable that equals one (zero) if the country-specific earnings management score described in Table 3 Taken together, the results presented in this subsection suggest that country and industry level variables are too crude to explain cross-sectional variation in our estimated IFRS effect on Open
Market trading volume. 22 The country-specific earnings management score is updated and slightly modified version of the measure introduced by Leuz et al. (2003) . The correlation between their measure and our updated score is 0.83. 23 Alternative proxies for the strength of the enforcement systems such as MCAP/GDP (see Table 3 ) or the Worldwide Governance Indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2009) confirm this finding.
Treatment Group Partitions at Firm Level
We use four different variables to partition the treatment group at the firm level. 
Conclusions
This study examines the impact of global IFRS adoption on trading volume in the Open Market. The Open Market is a segment at FSE designed for German individual investors to trade foreign (i.e. non-German) stocks. We find strong evidence that stocks experience an increase in Open Market trading volume following mandatory adoption of IFRS. This finding is consistent with the idea that collective IFRS adoption reinforces cross-border equity investments by individual investors.
Taken at face value, our results support the efforts by the IASB and standard setters around the world to foster a single global set of financial reporting standards. However, we urge caution in interpreting the results in this study. First, our dataset does not allow us to directly observe if and how global IFRS adoption influences individual investors decision making and trading in the Open Market. Despite our extensive efforts to control for other determinants of Open Market trading volume, we can therefore not fully rule out the possibility that our results reflect concurrent institutional changes that are not related to global IFRS adoption. Second, our analyses and, thus, the estimated IFRS effects are based on the Open Market sample. The Open Market sample is a large but selected subset of the universe of global stocks comprising companies that are significantly more visible and transparent. It is questionable whether our result also apply to the less visible and transparent rest of the universe of global stocks. Third, we recognize that individual Open Market investors taking active positions in individual foreign stocks are not necessarily representative of the universe of individual investors in the global economy. However, the IASB"s and other standard setters" efforts are naturally targeted towards investors who use financial statement information in their investment decisions. Individual investors who engage in cross-border investments are likely to be an important subset of this group.
APPENDIX A
Comparison of Transaction Costs: Open Market versus Home Markets
German investors have two options when trading foreign stocks that are included in the Open Market. They can either trade at FSE or they can trade abroad, i.e. in the respective home market.
Both options involve transaction costs that differ considerably in nature. This appendix seeks to illustrate these differences by means of an example. 
Taken together, this example confirms our depiction of the Open Market as a platform for
German individual investors to trade small sizes of foreign stocks. 25 The difference in transaction costs between FSE and MSE is a monotonic function, because the price advantage of MSE (about 0.5%) is larger than the advantage of FSE in variable order fees (about 0.12%). The advantage of FSE in fixed order fees therefore has less impact on the total transaction costs the higher the trade size. 26 The order value (order processing costs) is (are) 756.00 ( 
APPENDIX B
Statistics from Brokerage Dataset
This appendix describes a proprietary dataset from a German online broker which comprises information on trading activities and portfolio positions for a sample of approximately 3,000
German individual investors during the period January 1997 -March 2001. 28 We use this dataset to empirically validate the following two arguments First, we examine where the individual investors covered by the brokerage dataset trade foreign (i.e., non-German) stocks. Table B1 shows that these investors make 93.5% (113,352 / (113,352 + 7,817) of the trades in foreign stocks through the Open Market and that trade sizes in the Open Market are substantially lower than trades that are made through the home markets.
Untabulated statistics show that the mean size for trades in the Open Market (home markets) is 4,840 (11,289) Euro. These results confirm that German individual investors trade foreign stocks primarily through the Open Market, especially when trade sizes are low.
The second analysis focuses on the relation between changes in Open Market trading volume and changes in portfolio holdings. We calculate these changes at the firm period (= six months) level and aggregated over all individual investors in the brokerage dataset. 
Competitors of the FSE Lead Broker
The lead brokers at FSE face competition from alternative trading channels within and outside FSE. This appendix provides details on these trading channels.
Within FSE, there are two trading platforms that work in parallel: (1) the floor where the lead brokers operate and (2) the fully electronic XETRA where quotes are automatically determined by an open limit order book. Order processing costs are lower in XETRA, but its anonymity induces higher costs arising from adverse selection. Since the adverse selection component becomes more important when trading volume is low, the floor is more attractive for less liquid stocks (Theissen, 2002) . Consistent with this evidence, we find that trading activity in the illiquid Open Market usually takes place in the floor, but shifts to XETRA if liquidity is high.
Specifically, trading activity in the floor is higher in 97.71% of all firm periods in the Open Market sample. In contrast, the difference in mean trading volume (Trading Volume (Euro)) is less pronounced between both systems (floor: 11,430 Euro, XETRA: 6,911 Euro). For our main analyses, we use trading volume from both the floor and from XETRA. We perform the same set of tests using only trading volume from the floor. The results remain largely unchanged. For example, the coefficient estimate on Post-IFRS*Mandatory is 0.382 with a t-statistic of 3.27 if regression model 4 in Table 4 is re-estimated with floor trading volume as the dependent variable.
Outside FSE, trading segments similar to the Open Market exist at regional German exchanges in Berlin, Stuttgart and Munich. Datastream data indicates that these segments are smaller and less liquid than the Open Market in Frankfurt. Applying the selection criteria described in section 2.2., we identify a sample of 13,805 firm periods (6% of the DS Universe) for Berlin, 2,872 firm periods (1%) for Stuttgart and 441 firm periods (0%) for Munich Stock Exchange. Hence, the Open Market sample (43,671 firm periods) is more than twice as large as the combined samples of the other three German exchanges. The mean proportion of non-zero trading volume days is 2.41% in Berlin, 3.79% in Stuttgart and 4.76% in Munich, compared to 24.73% at FSE (see the statistics on Trading Days (%) in Table 2 , Panel A). We conclude that trading is a rare phenomenon at the regional German exchanges. To address potential coverage and quality issues with Datastream data, we analyze a further proprietary dataset from FSE that contains monthly trading volume in all Open Market stocks separately for FSE and, if applicable, for other German exchanges. 29 Descriptive statistics show that FSE combines 82% of the aggregate trading volume in these stocks. Taken together, these results suggest that the Open Market lead broker at FSE faces little competition from other German exchanges. 
TABLE 1 (continued)
This table presents the sample composition by country and across time. The Datastream Universe (DS Universe) comprises a total of 217,772 firm periods (= six months each) from 41 countries between 2002H1 and 2008H1 with sufficient data on trading volume, stock returns and accounting standards followed. H1 (H2) indicates the first (second) half of the respective year. We split the DS Universe into two groups: (1) countries that introduced IFRS in fiscal year 2005 (treatment group), and (2) countries that required domestic accounting standards throughout the sample period (control group). We include only companies in the treatment group that switched from local GAAP to IFRS before (IFRS Voluntary) or in fiscal year 2005 (IFRS Mandatory). The control group consists of companies that used domestic accounting standards (Local GAAP) throughout the sample period. For simplicity, we refer to Hong Kong as a country in our analyses, although it has the status of a Special Administrative Region of the People"s Republic of China. Using proprietary data from Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) we identify all firms within the DS Universe whose stocks are traded in the Open Market. Level) is an updated country-specific earnings management score based on Leuz et al. (2003) . To construct this score we use all firms in the DS Universe with sufficient accounting data in Worldscope for fiscal years 2001-2009. The score is the average country-specific rank of three earnings management measures: (1) the country"s median ratio of the firm level standard deviations of operating earnings and cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), (2) the country"s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), and (3) the country"s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow from operations. MCAP/GDP is the ratio of a country"s stock market capitalization to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Yearly ratios are obtained from the World Bank (www.fsdi.org). We compute this variable as the mean ratio over the period 2001-2004. Euro distinguishes between countries that have adopted the Euro as their national currency (variable equals one) and countries that have not (variable equals zero). We collect this information from the European Central Bank (www.ecb.int). Distance Berlin -Capital is the distance between Berlin, capital of Germany, and the capital of the respective country in kilometers. Data source is the French research centre in international economics (CEPII). For a description of the remaining variables see Table 2 . Panel A reports probit (model 1-2) and OLS coefficient estimates (model 3-4), respectively, and (in parentheses) t-statistics. The tstatistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by country. We use the natural logarithm of the raw values where indicated. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively. In Panel B, we focus on Open Market stocks and compare abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements at Frankfurt Stock Exchange versus the respective home markets. The analysis is based on a sample of 18,362 annual earnings announcement dates retrieved from IBES. Abnormal trading volume is the difference between trading volume on the event day and the mean daily volume for that stock over the pre-announcement window (-120, -21), scaled by the mean daily volume. Abnormal trading volume is winsorized, by event day, at the 99% level. To test for significance we use the Corrado"s (1989) non-parametric rank test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively. (Table 4) , respectively, by defining Post-IFRS to switch up to two periods earlier or later. For simplicity, we only report coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the interaction term Post-IFRS * Mandatory. In Panel B, we perform withincountry analyses for the United Kingdom (regression model 1 and 2) and Australia (regression model 3 and 4). In model 1 and 2, we use mandatory IFRS adopters listed in the Main Market at London Stock Exchange (LSE) as the treatment group and companies listed in the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) at LSE as the control group. AIM companies were not required to adopt IFRS before fiscal year 2007 and therefore not included in the Open Market sample presented in Table 1 . All variables are defined as in Table 4 . We delete firm periods of AIM companies after these adopted IFRS. This procedure yields a sample of 2,104 (437) firm periods from 302 (93) mandatory IFRS adopters (AIM companies). In model 3 and 4, we focus on mandatory IFRS adopters from Australia and distinguish between early (fiscal year ends in December 2005) and late adoption (fiscal year ends in June 2006). Late is a firm-level dummy variable and indicates late adopters. In contrast to the other specifications in this paper, Post-IFRS equals one (zero) for periods 2006H1 and later (2005H2 and earlier) for all firms. For a description of the remaining variables see Table 4 . The Australian sample comprises 311 (1,395) firm periods from 49 (359) early (late) adopters. Panel B reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics. The t-statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. We use the natural logarithm of the raw values (plus a small constant when the raw value is zero) where indicated. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively. the median percentage in the treatment group. We use 48 industries based on the classification in Fama and French (1997) . Large IFRS Restatements equals one (zero) if the percentage difference between the restated net income under IFRS and the originally reported net income under local GAAP for fiscal year 2004 is above (below or equal to) the median percentage difference. Restatement information is from Worldscope and only available for a subset of mandatory IFRS adopters. Strong EA Reactions equals one if the average Open Market trading volume during the three-day window around the earnings announcement is higher than the average Open Market trading volume over the relevant firm period, and zero otherwise. Low FSE Liquidity before IFRS equals one (zero) if the average Open Market trading volume before fiscal year 2005 is below (above or equal to) the sample median. The sample median is calculated separately for voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. High Stock Return after IFRS equals one (zero) if the stock return over three firm periods 2007H1-2008H1 is higher than (lower than or equal to) the sample median. The sample median is calculated separately for voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. The firm periods used for return calculation are not considered in the analysis, i.e. the regression is based on the periods 2002H1-2006H2. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics. The t-statistics are based on standard errors that are clustered by country. We use the natural logarithm of the raw values (plus a small constant when the raw value is zero) where indicated. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively.
